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Does Peer Ability Affect Education Choices?
Luca Facchinello?
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Abstract
Classroom ability matters if children assess their own academic ability relative to their
peers. I use detailed survey and administrative data on a cohort of Swedish 6th graders
to estimate the effect of classmates’ ability on students compulsory school choices. Class
ability appears to be as good as randomly assigned within schools, which allows to give
causal interpretation to the estimates. I find that a one standard deviation increase in
average class ability reduces by 2 percentage points the probability of taking an advanced
math course in grades 7 to 9. Peer ability does not affect English course choices in grades
7 to 9, and whether students choose academic tracks in high school. I look at underlying
mechanisms and show that peer ability negatively affects students’ assessment of own
ability. The different reduced-form effects on math and English course choices reflect
different spillovers in performance: students benefit much more from from having high
ability peers in English, an interactive subject, than they do in math. Finally peer ability
does not seem to affect student’s motivation, class interaction and parental support, but
positively affects teacher interaction.
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1 Introduction
Most of the literature on peer effects in the economics of education focuses on how peer
performance affects individual school achievement. The literature, recently reviewed by Sac-
erdote (2011), finds either positive, zero or non-linear effects.1
To make sense of the mixed results recent work has started to focus more explicitly on
mechanisms. An emerging literature highlights how better peers can negatively affect student
performance and academic choices due to rank concerns. Murphy & Weinhardt (2014) find
that students who rank high in their school develop higher confidence, and perform better in
class. Tincani (2015) shows that rank concerns and academic competition generate positive
peer effects in academic performance among Chilean 8th graders. Elsner & Isphording (2015)
find that ranking higher in high school significantly affects perceived intelligence, teacher
support and long-run educational outcomes of students.
In this paper I investigate how classmates’ ability affects the school choices of Swedish 6th
graders. Instead of considering only peer effects in performance or pure rank effects, I look
at the overall effect of peer ability on education choices. I then proceed to study underlying
mechanisms.
The institutional setup is particularly suitable to answer the research question. Swedish
students do not get formal grades during the academic year, and start to be assigned end-
of-the-year grades relatively late during compulsory school (typically in grade 7, at age 14).
Class interactions might play an important role for the formation of beliefs about own ability
in such an environment. At the same time students need to asses their academic ability when
they choose whether to take advanced or general courses in grades 7 to 9. Advanced courses
are more challenging and prepare for academic high school tracks, the only option to access
college.
These choices are the main outcomes in my analysis. They are recorded in my dataset,
together with IQ-like ability tests, for a representative sample of Swedish 6th grade classes.
I identify the effect of interest by exploiting variation in average class ability within
schools. I show that this variation is orthogonal to different measures of own ability, parental
occupation, special education status, gender, and class size. This is evidence of students being
1 Hanushek et al. (2003), Ammermueller & Pischke (2009) and Imberman et al. (2012) find positive peer
effects on student performance in primary or secondary school. Sund (2009), Lavy et al. (2012a), Burke &
Sass (2013), Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2014) and Tincani (2015) find instead non-linear or zero effects.
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allocated to classes independently of their ability, which is credible given school administra-
tors lack early measures of academic performance.
I find that a one standard deviation increase in average class ability reduces by 2 per-
centage points the probability of taking an advanced math course in grades 7 to 9. Peer
ability does not affect English course choices in grades 7 to 9, and whether students choose
academic tracks in high school.
Children’s survey responses and administrative data allow me to look at the underlying
mechanisms. First, I find that peer ability negatively affects students’ assessment of own
ability. Second, I look at how peer ability affects academic performance. I show that students
benefit much more from from having high ability peers in English, a subject involving group
interaction, than they do in math. Assuming that academic performance positively affects
education choices, this could explain why I find a negative effect of peer ability on course
choices only in math. Finally peer ability does not seem to affect student’s motivation, class
interaction and parental support, but positively affects teacher interaction.
In terms of mechanisms, results are consistent with Elsner & Isphording (2015), who
find that higher school rank improves perceived intelligence and teacher support. The same
paper however also finds a positive effect on long-run academic choices and performance. I
find no evidence of an overall increase in student confidence (“motivation” in my analysis), as
in Murphy & Weinhardt (2014), or lower academic performance, as predicted by Tincani’s
model of rank concerns. I cannot however exclude that these two effects might be at play,
when keeping ability fixed. All the cited papers indeed look at a pure rank effect. If peer
ability affects performance in the opposite direction, as shown in my results, the overall effect
on performance and motivation will systematically differ.
The main contribution of the paper is indeed estimating the net effect of peer ability on
academic choices. Ultimately this is the relevant parameter policy makers should consider
when designing tracking and streaming policies.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 I describe the data, the education system,
and present descriptives. In Section 3 I discuss potential mechanisms and identification, and
present the main results. Section 4 presents additional results related to the mechanisms.
Section 5 draws conclusions.
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2 Setup
2.1 Data
I use data from Evaluation Through Follow-up (ETF), a longitudinal project surveying every
five years representative samples of Swedish students enrolled in compulsory school. I use
wave three of the study, which sampled whole classes of 6th graders from 29 municipalities.2
Most students were born in 1967, and were around 13 at the time of sampling. While classes
obviously change over time, all students, apart from those who moved abroad, were followed
up.
The most important piece of information in my analysis, the “treatment”, is the cognitive
ability of the students. During the spring term of school year 6 most students (89% of the
final sample) took a battery of three standardized ability tests: a test of verbal ability, a
test of inductive ability, and a test of spatial ability. Students had respectively 15, 27 and
22 seconds to answer each section of the test, assuming they wasted no time at all. The
fast pace of the test adds to the quality of the ability measures: Borghans et al. (2008)
show that reducing the time available for completing intelligence tests reduces differences in
effort between students with different non-cognitive traits. Moreover at the time of the tests
students were 13, a point in which IQ should have already stabilized (Cunha & Heckman,
2009).
A unique feature of the data is the detailed survey that most children (92.5% of the final
sample) filled in in grade 6. Among the questions asked, children had to evaluate own ability
in different domains, and were asked to rank themselves in the class. The same survey also
asked many questions about school motivation, parental support at home, perceived teacher
helpfulness, and class environment. These questions allow me to test how peer ability affects
education choices, and thus to better clarify mechanisms.
Finally the ETF data contains basic demographics taken from Statistics Sweden (gender,
parental occupation, socioeconomic status, foreign status) and detailed school level data up
to college (course choices, absences, changes of teachers and grades in compulsory school,
tracks and grades in high school). This allows me to look both at choices taken during grade
6 (course choices in grades 7) and choices taken some years after (course choices in grades
2Municipalities were drawn using stratified sampling. Strata are defined by population, fraction of left-wing
voters, fraction working in the public sector and fraction of immigrants. The three biggest municipalities in
Sweden (Stockholm, Malmö, Gothenburg) are always part of the sample. Further details on the sampling
scheme can be found in Emanuelsson (1979).
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8 and 9, track in high school). Test scores data allows me to inspect potential spillovers in
performance of class ability.
The original sample consists of roughly 9000 Swedish compulsory school students (10%
of the targeted population) living in 29 (out of 290) municipalities, the lowest administrative
unit in Sweden. I exclude from my sample classes with less than 10 students, which are
are more likely to cater exclusively to special education students. This reduces the sample
by 8%. About 15% of the students misses ability data, so the final sample consists of 7913
students, 373 classes, and 257 schools. My preferred specification uses school fixed effects.
This sample, from now on the restricted sample, uses only schools where more than one class
was sampled. It consists of 4452 students, 204 classes, and 88 schools (50% of the final
sample).
2.2 Education System
Compulsory school in Sweden starts at age seven, and lasts nine years. In this period it was
formally divided in three stages, which could also entail students changing schools: early
compulsory school (grades 1-3), middle compulsory school (grades 4-6), and late compulsory
school (grades 7-9). While the data does not report whether students were in the same class
starting from grade 1, the majority of sampled students should have stayed for at least 3
years in the same class, from age 10 to 13.
Whether students rely on peer interaction to assess own ability depends also on the
feedback information they receive in class. In Sweden students are not assigned formal
grades during the school year. They instead receive homework and test scores (without a
pass or fail threshold). End of the year formal grades, based on standardized national tests,
were assigned to all students in grades 7-9. About half of the sample received grades also at
the end of school year 6, and, less likely, of grade 3. The decision to assign early grades was
taken by municipal school boards.3
What is relevant for the analysis is that up to the grade considered students had only
a limited amount of information to assess their ability, especially in relation to a national
benchmark, or a proper criterion. Classroom peers might thus have played a bigger role in
how these students were forming beliefs about own ability.
In the spring of school year 6, children chose whether to take math and English at
3Sjögren (2010) provides details on the implementation of the reform that abolished “early grades” - grades
in school years 3 and 6. Facchinello (2016) focuses on the cohort born 1967 to evaluate the effects of the
reform in the short and long-run.
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the advanced or general level in the next school year. Advanced courses provided better
preparation for academic tracks in high school. Students were allowed to switch course type
over time - the most common switch was from an advanced to a general course. At the
end of compulsory school, students could enroll in either academic or vocational high school
tracks. Vocational tracks lasted two years, provided professional training, and did not allow
direct access to college. Academic high school tracks lasted three or four years, prepared for
college, and could be selective.4
After academic high school graduation (or after taking one more year of high school after
vocational school) students became eligible to apply to college. A student quota, set by the
government, limited access to college. Slots were competitively assigned to the students with
highest GPA or SweSAT (a college entry test similar to the American SAT).5 College was
tuition-free, and a mix of grants and income-contingent loans allowed admitted students to
pay for living expenses. Higher education was thus both meritocratic and competitive.
2.3 Descriptives
Table 1 shows ability, demographics and class level information for the final and restricted
sample. The sample restricted to schools where more than one class was sampled appears
to be very similar to the final sample. The only differences are a slightly lower level of
ability and marginally larger classes. 40% of the students come from a working class family
(coded as low SES), and around 13% receive special education. The fraction of students with
foreign parents is quite low, 6%. There is variation also at the class level, which appears to
be particularly the case for class average ability, the share of students who are immigrant,
low SES and special education (see columns four and eight). This implies that the education
system is not uniform, with some segregation at the class level.
Table 2 presents descriptives for the main outcomes in the analysis. In terms of school
choices, about three quarters of the students select advanced courses in grade 7. However
over time many switch to the easier general courses. This pattern is more pronounced for
math. 85% of the sample proceeds into high school education. Of the enrolled students, 56%
choose an academic track, which grants eligibility, but not necessarily admission, to college.
4A high grade 9 GPA and advanced math electives in compulsory school could be used as admission require-
ment.
5Öckert (2002) reports that around 50% of the students were rejected admission to college in the period I
study, confirming the selective nature of Swedish higher education.
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Table 1: Background: whole and restricted sample
All sample Final sample
Mean Median Sd Class Sd Mean Median Sd Class Sd
Ability
Standardized verbal ability 0.00 0.01 1.00 0.36 –0.02 0.01 1.00 0.37
Standardized inductive ability –0.00 0.08 1.00 0.38 –0.01 –0.04 0.99 0.35
Standardized general ability 0.00 0.06 1.00 0.39 –0.02 0.06 0.99 0.37
Demographics
Male 0.51 1.00 0.50 0.10 0.52 1.00 0.50 0.12
Low SES 0.40 0.00 0.49 0.17 0.40 0.00 0.49 0.17
Parent not Nordic 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.23 0.06
Special education 0.13 0.00 0.34 0.12 0.13 0.00 0.34 0.12
Class
Changes of teacher 0.50 0.00 0.81 0.82 0.51 0.00 0.84 0.84
Class size 24.00 25.00 4.46 4.87 24.54 25.00 3.61 3.91
The restricted sample includes only those schools where multiple classes were sampled. Class sd is the stan-
dard deviation of the class average. Ability measures are IQ-like scores taken at the end of grade 6. General
ability is the average of inductive and verbal ability.
Apart from the English and math test scores, all variables in the second part of the table
use the answers given by students in the grade 6 questionnaire, filled in by 92.6% of the
sample.
Students were asked to assess their skills in the class on a 1-9 scale, with 9 representing
the top in the class. I interpret this as a measure of relative evaluation of skills. Apparently
students tend to over-rank themselves when they evaluate their skills: the distribution would
be normal and centered on the mean value if evaluations were unbiased. Evaluation of skills
is an index derived from yes/no questions asking students whether they are good at math,
spelling, reading and at school in general. While the average student answers positively to
most questions, there is quite some variation in the answers.
The English and Math scores are the results of the national tests, and determine end-of-
the-year grades. Notice the substantial amount of variation at the class level.
Motivation, Class environment and Teacher helpfulness are indexes built from survey
questions asking respectively students: to evaluate own ability in different domains (math,
spelling, reading, etc), their motivation in school (if they put effort in school tasks, if they
give up easily, etc), availability and helpfulness of the teacher, and how they get along with
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their classmates. While teacher helpfulness and especially class environment are rated highly
by most of the students, there appears to be more variation in student motivation. Finally
most students appear to receive help at home with homework, though there is some variation
at the class level.6
Table 2: Outcomes: whole and restricted sample
All sample Final sample
Mean Median Sd Class Sd Mean Median Sd Class Sd
Choices
Advanced math in grade 7 0.74 1.00 0.44 0.14 0.75 1.00 0.43 0.13
Advanced math in grade 8 0.66 1.00 0.47 0.15 0.67 1.00 0.47 0.14
Advanced math in grade 9 0.55 1.00 0.50 0.16 0.56 1.00 0.50 0.17
Advanced English in grade 7 0.77 1.00 0.42 0.13 0.77 1.00 0.42 0.13
Advanced English in grade 8 0.74 1.00 0.44 0.13 0.74 1.00 0.44 0.13
Advanced English in grade 9 0.69 1.00 0.46 0.14 0.69 1.00 0.46 0.15
Academic track in high school 0.56 1.00 0.50 0.17 0.55 1.00 0.50 0.16
Mechanisms
Evaluation of skills in class (1-9) 5.75 6.00 1.59 0.42 5.77 6.00 1.58 0.42
Evaluation of skills (1-9) 6.68 7.00 2.43 0.77 6.71 7.00 2.42 0.76
Math std test score, Grade 9 0.01 0.06 1.00 0.52 0.01 0.06 0.97 0.53
English std test score, Grade 8 0.01 0.11 1.00 0.43 0.01 0.11 0.99 0.46
Motivation in school (0-9) 5.66 6.00 2.05 0.62 5.68 6.00 2.04 0.62
Class environment (1-9) 7.91 9.00 1.65 0.48 7.93 9.00 1.62 0.57
Teacher helpfulness (0-9) 7.07 7.50 1.86 0.62 7.03 7.50 1.87 0.67
Help at home with homework 0.80 1.00 0.40 0.12 0.80 1.00 0.40 0.12
The restricted sample includes only those schools where multiple classes were sampled. Class sd is the standard
deviation of the class average. Evaluation of skills in class is the answer to a question asking where the student
is in terms of skills in the class distribution. Evaluation of skills, Motivation, Class environment and Teacher
helpfulness are indexes built from survey questions asking respectively students: to evaluate own ability in dif-
ferent domains (math, spelling, reading, etc), their motivation in school (if they put effort in school tasks, if they
give up easily, etc), availability and helpfulness of the teacher, and how they get along with their classmates.
6Appendix A presents the distribution of the discrete variables and provides details on the constructions of
the indexes used in the analysis.
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3 Empirics
In this section I first discuss the mechanisms through which I expect peer ability to influence
individual choices. I then consider identification issues, and finally present the main results.
3.1 Mechanisms
The empirical model I would like to estimate is the following:
Yics = α+ βAbility−i,c + γ Abilityi + ics (1)
where i indexes the student, c the classroom, and s the school. I am interested in β, the
reduced form effect of peer ability on individual choices. While peer ability might affect
students in many different ways, the net effect might be more interesting for a policy maker
when considering class formation and streaming policies.
Different mechanisms might indeed contribute to the final effect. Among the ones that
might affect positively education choices there are performance spillovers and peer imitation.
Higher peer ability implies higher peer performance. Many studies find positive spillover
effects from being surrounded by better performing peers.7 Positive peer effects in perfor-
mance translate into a lower cost of education. In a simple model of education choice this
leads to more investment in education.
Higher peer ability also implies more students choosing academic education. If there are
imitation or role model effects, students’ education choices would be positively affected.
On the negative side students could make inferences about own ability using the class
as a benchmark. They could for instance judge their ability in relation to their rank in
the class.8 Average ability students surrounded by high ability peers rank low in the class,
might conclude that they are low ability, and thus revise downward their education choices.
The opposite would be true for students who interact with low ability classmates. This
7Studies that find positive peer effects on student performance in primary or secondary school are Hanushek
et al. (2003), Ammermueller & Pischke (2009), Imberman et al. (2012). Studies that find a non-linear or
zero effect effect are Sund (2009), Lavy et al. (2012), Burke & Sass (2013), Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2014) and
Tincani (2015).
8Recent literature shows that children have imperfect knowledge of their ability. See for instance Stinebrickner
& Stinebrickner (2012, 2014), Zafar (2011), Bobba & Frisancho (2014), Facchinello (2016). Murphy &
Weinhardt (2014), Tincani (2015) and Elsner & Isphording (2015) find that school and class rank matters
for performance and education choices.
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might be particularly important in the educational setup here considered, as most students
up to grade 6 do not have any formal grades. In appendix B I show that student ability
percentile rank within the class can differ substantially from the national percentile rank (a
more objective measure of ability). Moreover student percentile rank can differ substantially
between classes.
Secondly, peer ability might affect student motivation. This is related, but different from
the point above: even if students are not “framed” by their peers’ ability, they might feel
less enthusiastic about school when their performance is systematically lower than the one
of their peers. To what extent this might be true depends on both the education setup (how
competitive the education system is) and social norms (to what extent people are affected
by social comparisons). Swedish school curricula specifically emphasize cooperation and
integration, at the expense of class competition, so this effect might be less important here.
Other mechanisms that might affect education choices in less clear ways are responses
from classmates, teachers and parents. A class with higher ability might have less disruptive
kids, and thus offer a better learning environment. At the same time, being surrounded by
higher ability peers might create frictions between the children and their peers, for instance
due to a more competitive environment. In higher ability classes teachers might make classes
more challenging, but could also devote more time to low ability students. Finally it is not
clear whether parents are substitutes or complements in the education production function,
so they might either counteract or amplify any of the effects listed above.
Ultimately which of these mechanisms prevails is an empirical question. In my analysis
I will be able to look separately at most of the mechanisms I mentioned.
3.2 Identification
The effect I aim to estimate is called in the peer effects literature a “contextual effect”: the
effect of a pre-determined peer characteristic on an individual outcome. Identification of this
effect requires exogenous, or conditionally exogenous variation in peer ability.
If peer ability is randomly assigned at the cohort level, then β in equation 1 has a causal
interpretation. This is likely not to be the case, as peer ability is likely to correlate with
many other factors that also affect education choices (own ability, SES, school quality, etc).
However, if school administrators do not observe ability when they form classes, variation
in peer ability might still be random within school. This is likely to be the case in Sweden,
where there are no formal grades (proxying for ability) in early stages of education. My
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identification strategy relies on this exogenous variation. My final specification is:
Yics = α+ βAbility−i,c + γ Abilityi + Schools + ∆Xics + ics (2)
where Xics contains controls at the individual level.
Two issues specific to the identification of peer effects are “multiplier effects” (because
individual i’s behavior is affected by peer behavior, peer behavior will also be affected by
i’s behavior) and correlated shocks (rather than a genuine peer effect, the estimated effect
might reflect some specific shock common to the group, in this case the class).
If peer ability affects students’ choices at ages 14 to 16, those choices cannot have an
effect on the ability of the students, measured when students were 13. It is still possible that
peer ability in past grades affected students’ own characteristics, like own ability. In this
case I estimate the effect of “final peer ability” on later education choices, disregarding the
effect of peer ability on own ability in earlier stages. This is not a threat to identification,
but affects the interpretation of my estimates.
In terms of correlated shocks, the choices of the students and the ability composition of
the class are not measured at the same time, so the problem should not be there. However
class level characteristics, for instance teachers, might affect both choices and peer ability.
The literature (e.g., Heckman et al., 2007) seems to support the idea that ability at age 13
is stable, so I can exclude this type of effects.
Another important point is that ability measures typically contain measurement error. In
my specific case I use an average measure of ability, so there should be very little measurement
error. As long as peer ability is uncorrelated with own ability, which instead is going to be
affected by measurement error, there should be no bias in β.
In Tables 3 and 4 I test whether peer ability affects predetermined factors that might
affect education choices. Column 1 and 2 report respectively the coefficient β from the
following two regressions:
Yics = α+ βAbility−i,c + ics (3)
Yics = α+ βAbility−i,c + γAbility−i,s + Schools + ics (4)
Equation 4 adds school fixed effects to Equation 3, and a control for average ability of peers
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in the same school, excluding i. This test correction has been suggested by Guryan et al.
(2009), who show that in tests of peer ability a mechanical negative bias is induced by the
fact that higher peer ability in a group implies lower own ability within the group.
Column 1 of Table 3 confirms the selection problem mentioned above: higher peer ability
is positively correlated with higher own ability, kindergarten attainment, SES (which is
reflected in parental occupation in Table 4), and is negatively correlated with having foreign
parents and teacher turnover.
Column 2 of Tables 3 and 4 shows that within-school variation in peer ability is not
correlated with these variables. However I still find that one occupational dummy out of
ten, higher civil servants and senior salaried, is positively associated with peer ability. This
suggests that parents with high social status might still be able to place their children in
better classes.9
An important caveat is that I have no data on teachers, so I cannot test whether more
qualified or experienced teachers are systematically assigned to classes with higher or lower
ability. It is however reassuring to see that the test for teacher turnover passes. This suggests
that teacher assignment does not change with class ability.
9In the results section I perform robustness tests to understand whether this potential deviation from random
assignment affects the coefficient of interest.
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Table 3: Does peer ability predict student background?
Outcome OLS School FE
Standardized general ability 0.68*** 0.02
(0.02) (0.03)
Standardized verbal ability 0.56*** 0.06
(0.03) (0.04)
Standardized inductive ability 0.62*** 0.00
(0.03) (0.04)
Male -0.01 -0.02
(0.01) (0.02)
Parent not Nordic -0.01* 0.02
(0.01) (0.01)
Low SES -0.17*** -0.03
(0.02) (0.03)
Kindergarten 0.04** 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Hours of absence in grade 6 11.61 -53.28
(56.48) (57.56)
Special education -0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02)
No ability data 0.05 0.08
(0.03) (0.05)
Changes of teacher -0.31*** -0.17
(0.11) (0.17)
Class size 0.24 0.03
(0.58) (0.58)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table reports the coefficient from regressions of each out-
come variable on standardized class ability (excluding stu-
dent i). Column 1 corresponds to equation 3, column 2 adds
school FE and corresponds to equation 4. Standard errors
are clustered at the class level.
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Table 4: Does peer ability predict parental occupation?
Outcome OLS School FE
non-skilled workers, goods -0.04*** 0.02
(0.01) (0.01)
non-skilled workers, service -0.04*** 0.00
(0.01) (0.02)
skilled workers, goods -0.06*** -0.03
(0.01) (0.02)
skilled workers, service -0.01 -0.01
(0.00) (0.01)
lower non-manual ii -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
lower non-manual i -0.01* -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
intermediate-level non-manual 0.05*** -0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
higher civil servants and senior salaried 0.12*** 0.04***
(0.02) (0.01)
entrepreneur 0.02** 0.01
(0.01) (0.02)
farmer 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table reports the coefficient from regressions of each outcome vari-
able on standardized class ability (excluding student i). Column 1
corresponds to equation 3, column 2 adds school FE and corresponds
to equation 4. Standard errors are clustered at the class level.
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3.3 Results
Table 5 summarizes the main empirical results. I report the coefficient β from equation 2
for each outcome, under different specifications. Specification (1) does not include controls
apart from the pool correction (here school peer ability) suggested in Guryan et al. (2009).
Specification (2) adds a control for own ability. Specification (3) is my preferred specifi-
cation, and adds individual level controls for gender, parental occupation (10 dummies),
foreign parents and special education. Specification (4) adds class level controls: number of
teacher changes, class size, and fraction of students without ability data in the class. This
specification is added as a robustness check. Class level controls might correlate with class
ability, and are not necessarily exogenous. While they might introduce some bias into the
coefficient of interest, it is still important to check whether the coefficient of interest changes
significantly after controlling for these variables. Finally the last column reports the mean
of each outcome variable for the estimation sample as a reference.
Before interpreting results it is important to highlight again some points. First, the fixed
effects specification uses the subsample of schools where at least two classes were sampled.
In section 2.3 I showed that this restricted sample is very similar to the final sample. Sample
selection should not be an issue. However I use half of the original sample, and exploit only
within school variation in average class ability. This negatively affects the precision of the
coefficient of interest, which implies I cannot detect small effects. Second, I normalize all
ability measures at the cohort level. When interpreting the effect of higher peer ability, it is
important to recall that the standard deviation of mean class ability is around 40% of the
national standard deviation (see Table 1). Lastly, I cluster standard errors at the level at
which the “treatment” changes, that is at the class level.
I find a statistically significant negative effect of peer ability on the choice of advanced
math courses. This effect appear to persist over late compulsory school, and is stable across
specifications. An increase of one standard deviation in class ability reduces by 5.6 percentage
points the probability that a student takes an advanced course in math. This is a nontrivial
effect, and corresponds to a 2.2 percentage points reduction for a one standard deviation
increase of average class ability. Class ability instead does not significantly affect the choice
of an advanced course in English. The point estimate is negative, as expected, but much
smaller than the coefficient for math. Finally, peer ability does not seem to affect high school
track choice.10
10Facchinello (2016) shows that high performance and academic choices in late compulsory school do not
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Table 5: Main results
Outcome variable Class ability coefficient Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Advanced math in grade 7 -0.065** -0.069*** -0.056** -0.056** 0.752
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Advanced math in grade 8 -0.068*** -0.073*** -0.064*** -0.064*** 0.665
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Advanced math in grade 9 -0.060** -0.066** -0.060** -0.056** 0.563
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
Advanced English in grade 7 -0.027 -0.031 -0.017 -0.017 0.765
(0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024)
Advanced English in grade 8 -0.014 -0.018 -0.005 -0.008 0.735
(0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Advanced English in grade 9 -0.036 -0.041* -0.026 -0.030 0.686
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
Academic track in high school -0.008 -0.012 -0.014 -0.017 0.554
(0.035) (0.034) (0.028) (0.027)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table reports coefficients from a regression of each outcome variable on standardized class abil-
ity (excluding student i), controlling for school fixed effects. Specification (1) does not include any
controls apart from the pool correction (here school peer ability) suggested in Guryan et al. (2009).
Specification (2) controls for own ability. Specification (3) adds individual level controls (parental
occupation dummies, foreign parents, gender, special education status) to specification (2). Specifi-
cation (4) adds class level controls (teacher changes, class size, fraction of the class without ability
data) to specification (3). Standard errors are clustered at the class level.
necessarily translate into choosing academic tracks in high school. Controlling for ability, enrollment into
academic tracks appears rather to be related to SES.
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4 Mechanisms
In this section I present additional results, in order to better understand which of the potential
mechanisms outlined in Section 3.1 explain the main findings. I summarize these results in
Table 6, which follows the same structure of Table 5. All outcomes, apart from the test
scores, are derived from the survey questions given by students in grade 6.11
4.1 Beliefs
The first two rows of Table 6 relate in different ways to student self-assessment. Evaluation
of skills in class is the answer to a question asking students to rank themselves in their class
on a 1-9 scale. Students are asked to assess their skills, rather than their ability in class,
so I do not expect a one to one relationship with average class ability. Finding an effect
on this variable simply implies that students are aware of their peers’ performance. This is
a necessary condition for any mechanism that involves students assessing themselves with
reference to their peers. I confirm that average peer ability negatively affects how students
rank their school performance within the class. The effect is stable over all the specifications.
An increase of a standard deviation in ability reduces student evaluation by half a point in a
1 to 9 scale. This corresponds to one fifth of a point reduction for an increase of one standard
deviation in average class ability (about half of the between class standard deviation of the
outcome).
The previous result does not imply that students’ beliefs about own ability are affected
by peer’s ability. I can test whether this is the case looking at the effect of peer ability on
the variable Evaluation of skills, an index based on a battery of yes/no questions asking
students whether they perform well in different domains (sums, spelling, reading, school in
general). I find a negative and statistically significant effect, comparable in magnitude to the
one estimated for Evaluation of skills in class. This confirms that students assess their skills
in relation to their peers.
4.2 Performance feedbacks
Another important channel through which peer ability might affect choices is academic per-
formance. Positive peer effects in school performance could positively affect the choices of
students. This effect works thus in the opposite way of the belief channel. It is important
11See Section 2.1 for a description, and Appendix A for more details on the indexes used.
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to assess this effect in the light of the different results I find in math and English choices:
do different peer effects in performance explain the different effects I find? Rows 3 and 4
of Table 6 suggest this might be the case. I find statistically significant positive effects in
English, but not in Math performance. The magnitude of the coefficient in English is much
larger than the one in math: a one standard deviation increase in class average ability leads
to a 7% standard deviation increase in the national English test score. This suggests that
the two subjects are qualitatively different: there are more positive spillovers in performance
in English rather than math. It might simply be easier to learn from better peers when
studying a language - which generally involves group work and conversation - rather than
when studying math, where learning should be more individual.
4.3 Motivation and imitation
Peer ability might also affect students through changes in student preferences and willingness
to put effort in school. This in turn relates to two conceptually different mechanisms. On
the one hand, having better students in class might trigger imitation, and thus positively
affect school engagement. On the other hand if students’ beliefs about skills are positively
related to school engagement, the effect might go in the opposite direction. I look at the
overall effect by building a motivation index, scaled 0-9, using yes/no survey questions asking
students how engaged they were in school. Row 5 of Table 6 suggests that peer ability does
not affect motivation. Notice however that all the regressions from which this effect was
estimated exhibit very low R2, and thus also suffer more from precision issues.
4.4 Classmates, teacher and parental responses
Finally I look at whether students report in the surveys different behavior from their class-
mates, parents, and teachers, when assigned to higher ability classes. It is hard to establish
the direction in which peer ability should affect the behavior of these important inputs (see
the discussion in section 3.1), so these empirical findings are quite interesting to better un-
derstand mechanisms.
I find that higher ability classes do not significantly affect students’ interactions with
their classmates. They also do not seem to affect parental support. I find instead that higher
peer ability positively affects teachers’ helpfulness. A class with smarter children might
be easier to manage and to teach. This could improve teacher effectiveness for all students,
independently of their ability. Notice that the effect could have gone in the opposite direction
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if teachers adapted to the average ability of the class. In the setup considered this is not very
likely: in this period national curricula establish in detail the educational goals the class has
to achieve.
Table 6: Mechanisms
Outcome variable Class ability coefficient Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Evaluation of skills in class (1-9) -0.524*** -0.539*** -0.522*** -0.522*** 5.770
(0.078) (0.077) (0.078) (0.078)
Evaluation of skills (1-9) -0.598*** -0.610*** -0.557*** -0.554*** 6.711
(0.163) (0.162) (0.160) (0.162)
Math std test score, Grade 9 0.105 0.099 0.110 0.083 0.013
(0.082) (0.079) (0.078) (0.080)
English std test score, Grade 8 0.178** 0.176** 0.184** 0.151** 0.014
(0.074) (0.074) (0.073) (0.073)
Motivation in school (0-9) -0.132 -0.141 -0.131 -0.104 5.678
(0.134) (0.135) (0.134) (0.131)
Class environment (1-9) 0.064 0.061 0.081 0.095 7.935
(0.101) (0.100) (0.098) (0.096)
Teacher helpfulness (0-9) 0.309** 0.301** 0.316** 0.343** 7.031
(0.152) (0.148) (0.145) (0.148)
Help at home with homework 0.024 0.025 0.029 0.034 0.801
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table reports coefficients from a regression of each outcome variable on standardized class abil-
ity (excluding student i), controlling for school fixed effects. Specification (1) does not include any
controls apart from the pool correction (here school peer ability) suggested in Guryan et al. (2009).
Specification (2) controls for own ability. Specification (3) adds individual level controls (parental
occupation dummies, foreign parents, gender, special education status) to specification (2). Specifi-
cation (4) adds class level controls (teacher changes, class size, fraction of the class without ability
data) to specification (3). Standard errors are clustered at the class level. Evaluation of skills in class
is the answer to a question asking where the student is in terms of skills in the class distribution.
Evaluation of skills, Motivation, Class environment and Teacher helpfulness are indexes built from
survey questions asking respectively students: to evaluate own ability in different domains (math,
spelling, reading, etc), their motivation in school (if they put effort in school tasks, if they give up
easily, etc), availability and helpfulness of the teacher, and how they get along with their classmates.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper I use detailed survey data on a cohort of Swedish 6th graders to estimate
the effect of classmates’ ability on students’ choices in compulsory school. I find that a
one standard deviation increase in average class ability reduces by 2 percentage points the
probability of taking an advanced math course in grades 7 to 9. Peer ability does not affect
English course choices in grades 7 to 9, and whether students choose academic tracks in high
school.
I look at underlying mechanisms and show evidence that peer ability negatively affects
students’ assessment of own ability. This effect is known in the psychology literature as the
big-fish-in-a-little-pond effect (Marsh, 1987). The different effects I find on math and English
course choice appear to reflect different spillovers in performance: I show that students benefit
much more from from having high ability peers in English, an interactive subject, than they
do in math. Finally peer ability does not seem to affect student’s motivation, class interaction
and parental support, but positively affects teacher interaction.
The core literature on peer effects in education, recently reviewed by Sacerdote (2011),
finds either positive, zero or non-linear effects of peer performance on individual school
achievement. Consistently with this literature I find positive peer effects on academic per-
formance only for one subject.
Recent work has focused on a different channel, and shows that school rank, indepen-
dently of peer ability, can negatively affect student performance and academic choices.12
My results are consistent with Elsner & Isphording (2015), who find that ranking higher
in high school significantly affects perceived intelligence and teacher support, but I do not
find a positive effect on long-run academic choices. I find no evidence of an overall increase
in student confidence (“motivation” in my analysis), as in Murphy & Weinhardt (2014), or
lower academic performance, as predicted by Tincani’s model of rank concerns. I cannot
however exclude that these two effects might be at play, when keeping ability fixed. All the
cited papers indeed look at a pure rank effect. If peer ability affects performance in the
opposite direction, as shown in my results, the overall effect on performance and motivation
can systematically differ.
The contribution of the paper is indeed estimating the net effect of peer ability on aca-
demic choices. Ultimately this is the relevant parameter policy makers should consider when
designing tracking and streaming policies.
12See Murphy & Weinhardt (2014), Tincani (2015), and Elsner & Isphording (2015).
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A Indexes
This section presents in detail the indexes I use as outcome variables in the analysis.
Evaluation of skills in class is the answer to a survey question asking students to evaluate
on a 1 to 9 ordinal scale their position in the class skill distribution. If students evaluated
themselves in an unbiased way the distribution would be normal. There is instead a tendency
to overrate own skills within the class.
Evaluation of skills is a 1-9 index built from 4 yes/no survey questions, each one assigned
2 points, with the scale properly reversed when the question implies low skills: do you think
that you are good at sums? (+); do you think that you are good at spelling? (+); do you
think that you are bad at reading? (-); do you think that you do well in school? (+). The
distribution is concentrated on high values, but many students still answer positively only
to half of the questions.
Motivation is a 0-9 index built from 6 yes/no survey questions, each one assigned 1.5
points, with the scale properly reversed when the question implies low motivation: do you
give up if you get a difficult task to do in school? (-); do you often think about other
things when you do maths and writing in school? (-); do you think that it is unpleasant
to have to answer questions in school? (-); do you find it difficult to give the right answer,
even if you know it? (-); do you always do your best, even when the tasks are boring?
(+); do you get disappointed if you get bad results in a test? (-). While the majority of
students answer in a positive way to at least 3 items out of 6, there is a nontrivial fraction
of disengaged/demotivated students.
Class Environment is a 1-9 index built from 4 yes/no survey questions, each one assigned
2 points, with the scale properly reversed when the question implies low interaction with
other classmates: do you like working together with other children in the class? (+); do you
think that other children in the class like working together with you? (+); do you worry
about things that happen in school (-); do you often spend time on your own during breaks?
(-). The distribution is clearly concentrated on high values, with few students answering
positively only to some questions.
Teacher helpfulness is a 0-9 index built from 6 yes/no survey questions, each one assigned
1.5 points, with the scale properly reversed when the question reflects low teacher helpful-
ness/availability: do you ask the teacher for help when you do not understand? (+); would
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you like to ask the teacher for help more often than you do? (-); do you think that your
teacher cares about you? (+); do you often think that the teacher should care more about
you? (-); do you think that it is hard to understand when the teacher explains things for
all the class (-); Do you often think that you would like to understand things better when
the teacher explains things? (-). While the majority of students answer in a positive way to
at least 4 items out of 6, there is a nontrivial fraction of students who answers positively to
only three or less answers.
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B Rank Deviations
Figure B.1 shows that a substantial fraction of students exhibits nontrivial deviations between
their percentile rank within the class and in the national distribution. If students form their
beliefs about own ability with reference to their class, their evaluations might be thus biased.
Notice that this measure is to some extent affected by class size, as in smaller classes percentile
rank will mechanically differ from national rank, due to the different support of the variable.
While the previous picture shows deviations in ranking with respect to the national
distribution, it is important to understand whether class ranking would differ if students
were allocated to different classes in the same school. One way to see that is to consider
the students in the restricted sample, and measure their ability ranking when randomly
assigned to a different class in the same school. Figure B.2 plots the difference between actual
and simulated ranking for these students. There appears to be still a significant fraction of
students whose ranking nontrivially changes due to different class ability composition. Notice
that in this case the problem of class size is strongly reduced, due to the fact that there is less
variation in class size within school (the average within-school standard deviation in class
size is 1.8).
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